

## **Program Workshop on Multidimensional Mechanism Design**

### **Thursday 16.07.09**

09:00 Welcome

09:05 Daniel Vincent  
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

09:55 Claudio Mezzetti  
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium

10:45 Coffee

11:15 Debasis Mishra  
Robert's theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach

11:50 Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn  
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

12:25 Juan Carlos Carbajal  
Characterizing dominant strategy implementation in continuous domains

13:00 Lunch

14:30 David Rahman  
But Who will Monitor the Monitor

15:05 Dezsö Szalay  
Regulating a multi-attribute/multi-type Monopolist

15:40 Coffee

16:15 Wojciech Olszewski  
The principal-agent approach to testing experts Coffee

16:50 Michael Schapira  
On the Hardness of Being Truthful

19:00 Conference Dinner

### **Friday 17.07.09**

09:00 Herve Moulin  
A VCG mechanism to manage a commons with decreasing returns

09:50 Paul Milgrom  
Assignment Messages and Exchanges

10:40 Coffee

- 11:10 Shahar Dobzinski  
VCG-Based Mechanisms
- 11:45 Ron Lavi  
An Optimal Lower Bound for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms
- 12:25 Marek Pycia  
A Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms
- 13:00 Lunch
- 14:20 Sushil Bikhchandani  
Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- 15:10 22:00 Boat Trip

**Saturday 18.07.09**

- 09:00 Salvador Barbera  
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- 09:50 Philippe Jehiel  
On Transparency in Organizations
- 10:40 Coffee
- 11:15 Marc Uetz  
Optimal Mechanisms for Scheduling
- 11:50 Deniz Dizdar  
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem
- 12:25 Jason Hartline  
Approximation in Multi-Dimensional Pricing
- 13:00 Lunch
- 14:30 Ahuva Mu'alem  
On Multi-Dimensional Envy-Free Mechanisms
- 15:05 Sergio Parreiras  
Smooth, Ex-post Implementation with Multi-Dimensional Information
- 15:40 Coffee
- 16:10 Jinwoo Kim  
Collusion-Proof Implementation
- 17:00 Arunava Sen  
Incentive-Compatible Voting Rules with Positively Correlated Beliefs
- 17:50 Closing