Workshop 2: Information and Dynamic Mechanism Design

Date: June 25 - 27, 2009
Organizers: Dirk Bergemann (Yale University), Stephen Morris (Princeton University), Ilya Segal (Stanford University), and Juuso Välimäki (Helsinki School of Economics)
Venue: HIM lecture hall, Poppelsdorfer Allee 45

In recent years, new approaches in mechanism design have been invigorating the field, including new questions and issues concerning the role of information and dynamic aspects. The conference "Information and Dynamic Mechanism Design" brought together junior and leading senior researchers from the fields of economics, game theory and computer science to discuss recent insights, with a focus on the design of dynamic mechanisms and the role of information revelation in intertemporal environments. Among the topics to be covered were:

  • dynamic issues in mechanism/market design
  • information and information revelation over time
  • communication and information complexity
  • robustness and simplicity of mechanisms
  • mechanism design on the internet and in electronic markets