Max Planck Gesellschaft

HIM Trimester Program on

Mechanism Design and Related Topics

Participants’ Lecture Series

Lectures start at 12.00 in HIM’s lecture hall; Bring a sandwich if you wish!

June 2
P.Jaramillo: Re-allocation of objects: Dealing with indifference
C. Kayi, Maastricht Univ.: Allocation Rules on Networks

June 9
t.b.a.

June 16
R. Mueller, Maastricht Univ.: Characterizing incentive compatibility for convex valuations

June 23
S. Vieira Silva, IMPA, Rio d. J., Brasil: Nonlinear Pricing beyond the Demand Profile Approach
A. Blume, Pittsburgh Univ.: Language Barriers

June 30
D. Monderer, Technion, Haifa: Monotonicity and Implementability
R. Vohra, Northwestern Univ.: Optimal auctions with budget constrained bidders

July 7
A. Kartasheva, Univ. of Penn: Competition among rating agencies and ratings accuracy
S. Lauermann, Michigan

July 14
O. Gorelkina, Toulouse: Precluding Collusion in Auctions
A. Erdil, Oxford Univ.: Stochastic Dominance of Assignment Mechanisms

July 21
K. Barbosa, Toulouse: Free-Riding in Procurement Design: The Trade-off between Fixed-Price and Cost-Plus Revisited
S. Izmalkov, NES, Moscow: Mechanism Design with Privacy and No Trust"

July 28
T. Mylovanov